Europe will shape the 21st century: A conversation with Jean-Noël Barrot

Professeur d'International Relations.

C

'est un plaisir de vous accueillir à l'Institut de la Politique

mondiale. Nous

vivons pendant une période de profondeur géopolitique et instabilité.

La

guerre en Ukraine continue à refiner la sécurité européenne. La guerre en Iran

et

la

plus

grande instabilité dans le Médiaire portent des conséquences

globales. Et

la plus grande ordre d'ordre face la pression de la pression de la grande compétition

et

la fatigue institutionnelle.

Dans

ces

moments, la

diplomatie devient le travail pratique de naviguer l'incertitude,

de

maintenir la coopération, de éviter la crise de la croix.

Et

c'est pourquoi c'est important que nous créons un espace

où

des challenges comme lesquels que je disais peuvent être examinés

avec

rigueur

et

honnêtement.

C

'est le travail de ce que nous faisons

ici

à SIPA, et c'est le travail que nous faisons à l'Institut de la Politique

mondiale. Nous

convenons les politiques politiques, les scolaires, les pratiques et les étudiants pour discuter les questions les

plus

difficiles dans les affaires internationales avec candour et une commitment à un dialogue serious. Ce niveau de engagement, de nos étudiants, de nos étudiants, regardez-vous à

cette

salle, reflètes un sens d'urgence de

l'urgence

sur le monde qu'ils sont en train

d

'inherit

et

une determination pour aider à construire.

Nous

sommes très heureux d'obtenir aujourd'hui notre programme à ce moment-là,

et

d'avoir un certain nombre d'interests de cette conversation.

C

'est un commitment qui est également reflète dans notre partenariat

global,

including notre dual degree avec CNSPO. Est-ce qu

'on

a quelqu'un de CNSPO

aujourd

'hui? C'est-ce

qu'il y

a

quelqu'un de CNSPO aujourd'hui?

C

'est-ce qu

'il y a quelqu'un de transatlantique qui est très important aujourd'hui.

C

'est-ce qu'il

y a donc, c

'est

-ce qu

'il

y

a mon privilège et mon honneur de présenter Jean-Noël Baron. Le ministre Barraud apporte à ce rôle une combattance d'intérêt intellectuel,

d'expérience

politique,

d

'expérience politique, et de

leadership politique.

Avant d'assumer sa position actuelle

à

ce ministre, il s'est

-ce qu'il s

'est

-ce

qu'il

s'est-ce qu'il s'est-ce qu

'il s'est, on innovation, regulation of the digital economy, and Europe's technological competitiveness.

He

has been closely associated with efforts to strengthen European strategic autonomy, particularly in the areas of digital governance, industrial policy, and economic resilience.

He

was trained as an economist and having held several academic appointments, he also represents a generation of policymakers who move fluently between ideas and implementation.

In

his current role, he is at the centre of France's diplomatic effort on Ukraine, European security, transatlantic relations, and the evolving architecture of global governance.

More

broadly, he is known for advancing a vision of Europe that is both sovereign and engaged, and that is capable of acting independently when necessary while remaining deeply, deeply committed to alliances and multilateral cooperation.

That

tension

between,

sometimes between strategic autonomy and transatlantic partnership,

is

central to many of the choices facing Europe today, from increasing its defense budget to regulating AI and other emerging technologies.

After

Minister Baran speaks, he will be in conversations with our own, or his very own, Jean-Marie Guenma, where is Jean-Marie?

There

he is, whose leadership in international peace and security brings both experience and perspective to today's conversation.

He

is SIPA's Arnold Saltzman Professor of Practice in International and Public Affairs. He is the director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution,

and

he is director of SIPA International Conflict Resolution Specialization, and he is an IGP-affiliated faculty. Jean-Marie, thank you for guiding this important conversation.

And

my thank as well to the co-sponsor, to our co-sponsors, the Alliance Program,

the

European Institute, and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. Minister Baran,

we

are honored to welcome you here to SIPA and to the Institute of Global Politics. Everyone, please join me in welcoming Minister Jean

-Noël

Baran.

Thank

you very much for this warm welcome. It's good to be back at Columbia. I'm saying back because 20 years ago as I was starting my PhD, I spent a summer of research on this beautiful campus.

I

was not within SIPA. I was at the business school. It was still a very wonderful summer.

What

I would like to discuss this afternoon

is

the role that we can expect Europe to play

in

the upcoming decades in the 21st century.

We're

now living through a moment of profound transformation, a moment when the world

is

not just changing, it is accelerating and also hardening.

And

many will tell that the trajectory is already written,

that

the 21st century will be defined by one single story, the rivalry between two superpowers, the incumbent superpower and the rising superpower, a rivalry that will inevitably lead to some form of confrontation,

and

that will force every nation and every one of us to pick sides.

And

the idea I would like to promote

in

front of you is that in this geopolitical equation, there is an unknown variable,

and

this unknown variable is Europe,

and

that Europe can dramatically change this geopolitical equation.

But

before I get there, let me say, as

I

was earlier at the United Nations, that force has never disappeared from international relations.

It

was never abolished, not by international law, not by global institutions. It was disciplined on a simple idea, one that French philosopher Blaise Pascal captured centuries ago. Justice without force is powerless, but force without justice is tyranny.

So

the challenge has always been the same. Make sure that what is strong is just and strengthen what is just. And throughout the 20th century, we've tried

to

strike this balance. After World War I, the League of Nations was a first attempt, an admirable one but incomplete

because

it asked states to renounce force without giving them the means to trust that others would do the same.

So

the balance was not struck.

After

World War II, we learn from those failures.

And

the United Nations were born, the Bretton Woods institutions.

Those

did not deny power. They organized it. They structured it. They made it predictable.

Let's

not

be

naive. The great powers did not embrace this system out of charity.

They

embraced it because stability, predictability, and order served their interests better than chaos.

They

also benefited from a privileged position with permanent seats at the UN Security Council

and

veto power.

Without

that arrangement,

no

lasting multilateral system

would

have helped.

And

no country benefited more from it than the leading power of the 20th century, the United States of America.

The

US reaped extraordinary, exorbitant dividends from multilateralism.

Security

dividends.

Through

UN peacekeeping missions,

the

US relied on others to help uphold global stability.

Through

the non-proliferation regime, it avoided the spiral of a nuclear arms race.

And

through NATO, it did more than guarantee the security of the North Atlantic. It also created a market, one that sustained the strength of the American defense industry.

Security

dividend. Monetary dividend.

Under

Bretton Woods, the dollar became the world's reserve currency.

That

meant something very simple.

The

US could finance their economy, but also their budget deficit,

more

cheaply than anyone else. Deficits became easier to sustain. Monetary dividend.

And

commercial dividend.

Through

the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later,

thanks

to the WTO, American firms, especially in finance and digital services, were able to scale globally, with few barriers on their way.

Yet

things began to shift.

The

balance of power, carefully assembled over decades, started to loosen with the end of the Cold War.

The

collapse of the Soviet bloc was read in the West

as

final proof that the Western model had won.

A

world governed by law, organized by markets, anchored in democracy. The end of history

was

celebrated.

At

exactly the moment when, actually, history was starting again.

The

American hyper-power, confident and unchallenged, began to bend the very rules it had once defended.

And

for much of the world, this was not a moment of emancipation.

It

felt like supervision.

The

memory of colonial domination had not disappeared, nor the resentment of structural adjustment programs, nor the scars of unilateral interventions, and frustration gave way to something sharper, a desire for revenge.

Russia

saw NATO expansion as a form of aggression. China saw in liberal economics and human rights a system built without it. Across large parts of the world, multilateralism began to look less like a shared framework and more like a Western construction,

a

system designed by the West,

for

the West.

And

ignoring that perception does not make it disappear, just means that you no longer understand the world that you live in. Nowhere has this dynamic been more powerful than in China.

A

civilization that thinks in centuries.

A

civilization that sees itself not as a rising, but as returning from what it calls the century of humiliation, from the opium wars to imperial collapse.

And

the speed of that return has been staggering.

In

just four decades, China has transformed itself. Its share of global GDP rose from 2% to nearly 20%,

a

shift in the center of gravity of the world economy.

This

transformation lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty,

and

with prosperity came something else. Ambition.

To

reclaim a central role in the international order and to stand, eventually,

as

a peer, if not more, to the incumbent superpower, the United States.

And

China has been methodical. It has mobilized every level of power, deliberately, patiently, systematically.

Economic

power. Last year, China posted a trade surplus of over $1 trillion.

That's

not a coincidence. It is the result of a strategy.

An

aggressive industrial policy designed not just to grow, but to shape dependencies. Dependencies on rare earth, where China controls around 90% of refining. Dependencies on supply chains, on shipping, on ports and logistics networks, spanning more than 150 countries through the Belt and Road Initiative. Diplomatic power.

China

invests heavily in influence, bilaterally, regionally, and globally.

Through

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it anchors its neighborhood.

Through

BRICS, it challenges the diplomatic dominance of the G7, positioning itself as the voice of a global south, dissatisfied with the Western-led order.

And

today, BRICS outweighs the G7, both in population and economic weight.

Military

power.

The

People's Liberation Army

counts

over 2 million personnel,

the

largest in the world.

And

China also fills the world's biggest navy by the number of ships.

and

a missile arsenal designed with one purpose, keep American forces at a distance.

The

objective is clear, secure its region, deter intervention, and over time, reach strategic parity.

Put

it all together, and the picture is unmistakable, China is not only raising,

it

is positioning itself to lead,

to

become what it believes it has always been destined to be,

the

Middle Kingdom.

And

as China rises,

the

U.S. faces a familiar and dangerous trap.

What

some have called the Thucydides Trap, described over 2,000 years ago.

The

tension between a dominant power and a rising one.

A

tension that often leads to confrontation.

Look

back to

five

centuries before Christ. Sparta

faced

it when Athens rose,

and

it chose war to prevent Athens from reaching dominance.

The

Peloponnesian War.

30

years later, both cities, Sparta and Athens,

were

exhausted by war,

and

then came a third actor, Macedonia,

which

went on to conquer the Greek world. Macedonia did not win by chance.

It

won because while others were fighting or confronting,

it

prepared,

it

reformed. Militarily, it forged a professional army, developed new weapons, and perfected the phalanx. Politically, it centralized authority, and built a new disciplined elite. Financially, it created a stable currency and mobilized its resources for long-term ambitions.

While

others were exhausting themselves in endless wars, Macedonia was positioning itself

as

a third actor.

And

you might start thinking where I'm trying to go there.

Today,

in Washington, China is indeed seen as the defining geopolitical challenge of our time.

And

the response has been building through time. Tariffs targeting hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods.

The

banning of TikTok. FISA restrictions on Chinese students and researchers working in sensitive fields.

The

blacklisting of Chinese firms cut off from U.S. infrastructure and public procurement.

Export

controls on microprocessors, semiconductors, and advanced ships.

A

massive reinforcement of U.S. military presence in the Pacific.

An

attempt and rapprochement with Russia, seeking to pull Moscow away from Beijing in a reversal of Nixon's strategy.

A

military intervention in Latin America aimed at reshaping control over an oil-producing country central to China's supply. Territorial claims over a European territory under NATO protection justified as a way to prevent Chinese access

to

the North Atlantic.

These

are not isolated moves. They form a pattern, a strategy of containment.

And

so we find ourselves far from the spirit of 1945, far from the UN Charter. Instead,

we

are entering in a world of competing orders. China advancing its own vision of global governance.

The

United States proposing new structures, such as the Board of Peace.

Where

does this lead?

At

best, to a fragmented world, split into spheres of influence. At worst, to direct confrontation between two permanent members of the Security Council, to equip nations.

So

the question becomes,

is

this inevitable?

Are

we condemned to choose, to align, or to submit?

I

don't believe we are, because of Macedonia.

Because

in this equation that is complex, unstable, and still unfolding,

there

is one variable that can change the outcome.

One

variable that is not yet fully played, and that variable

is

Europe. Yes, Europe is the X factor in today's geopolitical equation.

Why? Well,

because this is where resistance to the brutalization of the world is indeed taking shape.

Because

from Southeast Asia to Latin America, across Africa, free people, and that are willing to remain so, are watching Europe, waiting for it to step up,

and

waiting for it to lead.

In

a world increasingly forced to choose between submission and confrontation, Europe is expected, where it has always been strongest,

in

the ability to chart a third path,

a

demanding path anchored in national sovereignty and in respect for international law. More and more states attached to their independence are refusing the logic of blocks.

They

are looking for balance.

They

are looking for space.

They

are looking for an alternative. And today, that alternative depends on one thing, a stronger Europe.

That

is why Europe is, in my view, the X factor.

Some

would rather see Europe as a political organization weakened. Others would prefer it divided. Many

would

be more comfortable if it simply disappeared from the equation.

On

the Chinese side, the strategy is subtle.

Beijing

is working to bypass the Europe as a union, engaging capitals one by one, building bilateral ties,

while

skirting the EU institutions themselves.

On

the American side, the challenge is more explicit.

in

the National Security Strategy published in December 2025,

Europe

is portrayed as weakened, undermined by migration, constrained in its freedoms, repressive towards political opposition.

A

continent condemned to civilizational erasure,

quote,

unquote.

The

logic is easy to see.

A

fragmented Europe is easier to dominate. A divided Europe is easier to align.

A

dependent Europe becomes a secondary player.

But

no, Europe is not on the brink

of

an eraser. European civilization is not fragile. It is a civilization of the mind,

forged

over more than two millennia, through conflict and reconciliation, through failure and renewal.

A

civilization that has known the worst and produced the best. Stefan Zweig called Europe a forge of ideas. And he was right. From the encounter of Latin, Germanic, Anglo-Saxon and Slavic worlds emerge ideas that reshaped history.

And

it is precisely this capacity to absorb, to transform and to create that gives Europe its civilizational depth.

Europe

was here before, and it will be here long after.

This

is a civilization that has faced division again and again,

and

each time found a way to rise above it.

Europe

has given so much to the world. It has shaped ideas, sparked revolutions, and defined what we mean by freedom and democracy.

This

continent gave birth to one of the most ambitious political constructions in history,

the

European Union.

born

on May 9, 1950 in Paris at the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Eight

decades of peace, eight decades of democracy, eight decades of prosperity.

Look

at the world today. Ten countries are candidates to join the European Union.

What

other political project inspires such attraction?

And

I'm saying ten,

but

that does not include Iceland or even Canada.

in

Tbilisi in Georgia,

on

the Maidan in 2014, people stood together, waved the European flag and singing the European anthem as a symbol of hope.

What

other political ideal inspires that kind of passion?

Look

at the outcomes.

people

live more freely in Europe.

They

live longer and in better health.

Life

expectancy is higher, about four years longer than in the US or China. Infant mortality is lower, often half as low. Inequality is lower as well.

This

is a model

worth

defending.

When

great powers compete without restraints,

bear

in mind that they also weaken themselves and they create space for others.

This

is the moment that we are going to live.

And

Europe is stepping up.

It

is stepping up into the space

that

is made available and seizing the opportunity.

Since

2017 and the Sorbonne speech delivered by President Macron calling for European strategic autonomy, we have moved

on

security, prosperity and democracy,

three

values at the heart of Europe's priorities.

On

security,

for

years, speaking of European defense was a taboo.

We

were told it would weaken NATO. Today, that debate is behind us. European defense is becoming a reality.

And

this shift is visible in concrete terms.

New

strategic frameworks,

stronger

coordination, greater role for the European Commission,

the

reactivation of the European defense agency, and new European funding instruments with a clear and assumed European preference.

And

sure,

Ukraine

has been a turning point.

Some

believe that Europe could not sustain Ukraine without the United States, that peace

would

be decided elsewhere.

Reality

proved otherwise.

And

as we are speaking, Ukraine is gaining ground after having survived one of the toughest winters in recent history,

while

Russia is failing.

Failing

militarily,

with

a loss of one million casualties since the beginning of this war,

and

more than 1,000 casualties per day on the front line. Failing economically as well,

with

an economy that is turning into a train rake.

And

we are preparing for peace.

We

launched the Coalition of the Willing,

and

we built something new. Today, Europeans, together with partners such as Norway, the UK and Canada, are delivering the bulk of support to Ukraine and preparing the security guarantees for the future.

We

support American diplomatic efforts,

but

we ensure that our interests are not overlooked,

because

peace cannot mean capitulation, and it can come at the expense of European security. Summary, Europe is now taking responsibility for its security.

On

prosperity,

European

economy faces a dual pressure. Chinese competition and American tariffs.

Even

countries that once ran suplices with China

are

now running deficits.

Even

Germany,

along

the industrial benchmark,

has

lost tens of thousands of jobs to China.

The

response must be clear,

and

now it's becoming to be.

First,

shelter our market from unfair competition.

Europe

is not just a marketplace.

It

is an economic power, and it must act like one.

That

shift is underway,

and

from steel to clean tech, from chemicals to automotive, Europe is deploying trade defense instruments. Tariffs on heavily subsidized Chinese electric vehicles are one example. European preference is no longer a concept. It is emerging as a policy.

Second,

strengthen competitiveness.

A

market of 450 million people must become a true economic force.

that

means less fragmentation, simpler rules, a deeper single market, capital markets union, integrated energy systems.

All

these reforms are on the table, and we are working to turn them into reality.

Third,

invest.

Europe

must invest more and faster in strategic technologies, such as AI, quantum, space, and green tech.

We

have the capacity. Europe holds the largest pool of savings in the world,

yet

too much of it flows abroad. This is not sustainable, and it is beginning to change. Fourth, diversify.

Europe

is expanding its partnership

recently

with India to open new markets and reduce dependencies,

because

resilience comes from choice,

and

Europe has what investors are looking for, a stable currency, a predictable regulatory environment, world-class infrastructure, a highly skilled workforce.

In

a world of uncertainty, Europe offers something rare,

trust.

Security, prosperity,

democracy. Europe's

independence is about protecting freedoms.

The

freedom to decide, to speak out,

to

vote, to move,

to

pray.

Our

democracy and the rule of law are the guarantors of those freedoms.

This

is why we have done so much to protect our democratic space. Defending academic freedom, protecting the independence of science, preserving an open but regulated information space.

A

space where ideas circulate freely, but where choices are not dictated by opaque algorithms.

This

is the purpose of the regulation that were adopted recently.

The

rise in information manipulation and disinformation is dividing our societies and eroding democracy.

This

is a major threat,

and

that is why we're building a European democratic shield.

We'll

set up a European center for democratic resilience that will bring together all the expertise and capacity across member states and neighboring countries to fight disinformation and protect our elections.

So

just like Macedonia during the Peloponnesian War, Europe is building its muscles.

Security,

prosperity,

and

democracy.

This

is how Europe is preparing itself for a world of rising rivalry between two blocks.

not

by choosing sides,

but

by building strength and power on its own terms.

And

in doing so, Europe is not just serving itself.

It

is actually serving the world.

By

keeping open,

or

let's say by opening and keeping open,

not

a straight,

but

a third path,

a

path that refuses both submission and confrontation,

Europe

is indeed serving the world.

Because

Europe is standing up for freedom and sovereignty wherever it is threatened, in an age of polarization, Europe can be a buffer, a stabilizing force for many countries that rely on it,

a

force that absorbs shocks and rises above them,

a

force that keeps the system from breaking apart.

Europe

is standing up for the vast majority of the people.

So

if you're asked today

what

defines the global geopolitical landscape,

one

thing is certain, Europe

is

rising. So friends, watch Europe, watch it closely.

If

you're looking for power, look at Europe.

If

you're looking for stability, look at Europe.

If

you're looking for opportunity,

look

at Europe. Because Europe is growing into a superpower that is attractive, democratic, and predictable.

A

place where prosperity is shared and where the pursuit of happiness is a reality.

So

friends, watch Europe,

watch

it closely,

because

it will play a very significant role

in

the geopolitical equation of the decades, perhaps the century to come. Thank you for your attention.

Minister, several

decades ago, Madeleine Albright talked about the United States as the indispensable nation.

And

I think you just gave us

a

vision of an indispensable continent,

Europe. Without

Europe,

we

will have a world of confrontation at worst, fragmentation at best, as you described.

And

I think many in this room would

agree

that indeed we don't want that future. And as you said, many countries want to embrace the European vision

of

a world governed by cooperation and multilateralism rather than the pure rule of force.

At

the same time,

I

have to be candid with you,

I

think a number of people wonder whether Europe, the European people are going in that direction.

They

see the rise of nationalism.

They

see institutions that are slow to make decisions. You talked about the acceleration of crisis.

And

so they see a tension between the slowness of institutions that usually leads to good decision, but those decisions are not necessarily at the pace needed by the present world. So you have been a very, I mean, you are a very experienced practitioner of European institutions. I think any foreign minister, and you are the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, spends a lot of time dealing with European colleagues. How do you think those institutions are going to evolve? How can

you

make them more attuned to the pace of a world in crisis?

Well,

thank you for this question. It is key.

To

me,

the

issue is not one of governance architecture.

Other

superpowers have been led in a collective manner.

Think

of Venedia, Venise,

that

were run by the Doge, by a collective group of people,

that

were able to make,

you

know, enlightened decisions and to maintain their domination for decades and centuries.

So

the issue is not the governance structure.

I'm

not sure the issue is with the rulemaking process.

We

feel it's too slow. It's often too slow.

But

it can also be super quick. Recall what happened

during

the COVID crisis, where in a few weeks only, the heads of states and governments of the European Union

were

able to agree on a historic common borrowing scheme

that

prevented the European economy to collapse.

And

just a few days after Vladimir Putin launched its war of aggression against Ukraine,

again,

the heads of states and government were able very quickly

to

adopt historic sanctions against Russia.

So

if it's not about the governance structure,

if

it's not about the rulemaking process,

what's

the problem?

Well,

to me the problem is the will and the courage.

It

is the ability of the European people to face reality

and

to make the right choices.

Choices

that call

decisions that

can sometimes be painful in order to preserve our model

and

to open this third path.

And

for that you need to fight against inertia

because

Europe,

including

the EU, was not created by Robert Schumann and Coran Adenauer

to

become a third path.

It

was created to diffuse tensions on the European continent by creating cooperation mechanisms across rivals so that rivalry and war give way to competition and cooperation.

And

so now the question is whether and how

much

we want to move from this political organization that has guaranteed peace and prosperity to something stronger and more independent, which is

what

we have been calling for again and again, what President Macron has coined strategic autonomy,

which

is making progress in the European minds, but which is not entirely translated into decisions as we speak.

But

it's really only about willingness to act in the face of reality.

So

opening the eyes of Europeans on the challenges,

on

the fact that their independence is at stake

and

that Europe has a unique and historical role to play in this world dominated by the rivalry of the two superpowers.

You

said that there are ten candidates

to

the European Union, which is really an illustration of the, as you said, of the validity

of

the model.

But

at the same time, it is a kind of challenge because

at

a time when people are so focused on identity, not having a clear sense of where Europe ends, that uncertainty, you can see it in campaigns against Europe, it is an issue. On Euronotes, there is a very clever way of – you don't know really where Europe ends on a banknote, on a European banknote. But we see that issue coming even just recently, the discussion on Ukraine. France has made a clear proposal on Ukraine and how Ukraine could join the European Union and we know all the challenges. Ukraine is a big agricultural power. It's also now a big in the defence industry power, but it does raise questions for the internal functioning of Europe. How do you see this management of a Europe that,

in

a way, will inevitably have kind of variable geometry and yet have a strong European identity?

The

people of Europe are feeling the pressure

by

the superpowers and they are not happy about it.

They

feel that

they

are being deprived of their ability to decide for themselves, to build their own destiny and to be free.

They

are not happy about the situation.

And

they are actually craving for more sovereignty.

And a

large number of them understand that some dimensions of their sovereignty

can

only be achieved at European scale.

And

that's why they are expecting

their

leaders, leaders

of

their countries but also leaders of European institutions,

to

stand up and to cater

to

their request for more sovereignty.

And

this is why I agree with what you say.

We

have a

common

currency, at least some countries of the European Union.

We

need to fix and to make more credible certain of the attributes of sovereignty that are now perceived as being,

you

know, half-baked by European citizens.

And

this includes the border.

The

border

is

felt by European citizens as being violated all the time.

With

products coming onto the single market illegally or not respecting the single market norms. Illegal immigration coming into the European territory without being credibly filtered or controlled at the border. Fortunately, we've started to take actions

to

make sure that the border is actually a border.

And

in particular, beginning in summer 26, there will be an actual, a true digital border

in

Europe, which is a result of the Pact on Asylum and Migration that was adopted in 2024,

with

actual controls and actual filterings.

But

it's not only the circulation of people, it's also the circulation of goods that is raising a lot of anger at the people level. And so, yes, I think that in the moment that we are living through, again, currency is already treated. The border is something that needs to be consolidated.

And

then defense

is

another attribute of sovereignty

where

people in Europe are expecting tangible acts and results.

I

think that the idea, which France does not support, of a European army has never been so popular as it is now in Europe.

Because

it is an attribute of sovereignty.

Now, what

will happen

if

in the face of the pressure that we are feeling more and more, that we are feeling the pressure of coercion, of tariffs, of everything else,

what

will happen if

we,

the leaders of Europe, do not cater

to

the aspiration of the European people for more sovereignty? What will happen?

Well,

they will seek

sovereignty

elsewhere.

And

they will go to those who have been doing that forever,

the

nationalist political forces.

And

that's the trap of history, right?

You're

under the pressure of superpowers.

You

have an open path towards more European sovereignty. But the superpowers do not even have to exert the pressure. You inflict

the

pressure on yourself by appointing nationalist leaders that are going to dismantle

the

solidarity links that we have created to be stronger and more sovereign, be it the EU or NATO. You see what I mean?

Those

who don't like

the

EU, as I was saying earlier, if nationalist parties or forces

get

traction in Europe, they will finish the job. Neither China nor the US have to do the job. They will finish the job instead of them.

And

so there is indeed an urgency to build those attributes of sovereignty. Is the EU,

the

27 and perhaps

soon

larger circle, is this circle

the

only one through which we can provide sovereignty to the people of Europe? No. Currency is not dealt at 27. Defense could be dealt in smaller circles. Border is dealt at a wider circle because Schengen is wider than the EU.

And

so we need to be pragmatic.

We

need to basically remain faithful to the single principle based on which the EU was founded, subsidiarity.

Whatever

is your purpose, make sure that you do it at the right level

where

power and responsibilities can be exercised in the most effective manner.

Yes,

but

if

I want to push you, I would say that

in

Europe, many people believe that Europe is not fully using the levers of power it already has. My colleague at Columbia, Anu Bradford, the Columbia Law School, has written about the Brussels effect, the Europe as a normative power, which indeed it is.

But

in difficult situations,

there

are questions.

Let's

see peace and security. There have been

clear

violations of basic, not norms, but really articles of the United Nations Charter. In a country that is close to the heart of all French people, Lebanon, we see the issue really now. And yet there are declarations, significant declarations, but

there

is a sense that Europe,

when

it comes to international law and international humanitarian law, is not always using all the levers that it could use. And that damages its image. When I live in New York, I see the United Nations, it damages its image. That's one issue. And when we come to tech,

we

see how, yes, the European Union has issued a number of strong regulations, but it hesitates to impose big fines on tech giants because it is afraid of the repercussions with the U.S. tariffs. And so we see a Europe that is potentially powerful, but that is

hesitating. Yes, that hesitates to speak freely because of two reasons, I think.

One

is that it remains too dependent on others. And so when you're dependent

for

your

day

-to-day subsistence or for your security,

then

you think twice before you make strong statements about something that happens on the other side of the planet.

This

is perhaps why France

is

sometimes seen as speaking a little bit more freely than other European countries, because we've made choice after Suez

to

be more independent on our energy supplies and on our security than other European countries.

So

what's the response to this first reason why we sometimes do not speak or act

as

we should in foreign policy matters? Well, it's to reduce our dependencies. Let's get rid of them.

Let's get rid of them

in order to speak freely

and

to make our own geopolitical choices and decisions.

What's

the other reason?

We

had this discussion with our ambassador on the way here in Colombia.

There

is something about inertia

and

about courage.

Again,

the EU was founded

thanks

to the US, with the help and the support of the US,

by

countries that have relied significantly on the US to grow back

after

or on the ashes of the Second World War.

And

this has created in the administrative ethos of Europe a strong inertia.

And

it is hard to change those deeply rooted habits.

People

are asking themselves,

if

I really listen to the French and I'm going to

take

these reckless decisions, what's going to happen to me?

Am

I not going to lose everything?

Am

I not going to risk my comfort, my safety, my prosperity?

So without

being arrogant,

because

I didn't make these choices, the ones that General de Gaulle made

decades

ago, but I inherit from those choices. And the very least I can do is explain those choices to my European friends and colleagues

and

tell them,

get

rid of your dependencies. You will speak freely and you will be respected for that and your impact will increase.

And do

not

overestimate

the cost associated with changing habits,

with

living inertia. Yes, it can be a little bit, you know, it can hurt a little bit,

but

it can also bring a lot of good to you and to your people. And so you need to have the courage to take this kind of risk.

But

all of this will not solve our issues with international law and the international humanitarian law.

And

there are constant violations now. Europe has contributed to build this architecture. Europe should take its responsibility to safeguard it.

But

I think we have an organization, an institution that is now

being

paralyzed and that needs

strong

reform. This is something I tried to do while I was in New York earlier today. In particular to push, sorry to advertise what we're currently doing, but to push one initiative

that

I think is very important to restore the effectiveness of the Security Council in terms of peace and security,

which

is to restrain the veto power of permanent members of Security Council in cases of mass atrocities. This is an idea that France and Mexico

have

carried together for ten years

that

they got from the Syrian theater, where hundreds of thousands of people were being slaughtered and where

the

Security Council was blocked by

Russian

veto.

And

so we're trying to promote this idea, push it as far as possible and hopefully bring it to the General Assembly in the months to come.

I

don't know if I have time for one last question

about

China. You started with China, the two-city traps. How should Europe handle China? I mean President Macron I think in Athens said Europe has now three adversaries, President Putin, President Trump, Chairman Xi Jinping. That's a lot. The Europeans need to find some tactical accommodation with each of the three. And since we don't have enough time to deal with all three, I would ask you about China.

Yeah. A

lot of adversaries, but you know Asterix, we have a magic potion, so

we're

not afraid of anyone. The relation of France with China is deep, it's ancient, and it's very dense.

And

the way we approach China on some of the issues

that

raise concerns in France and Europe

is

based on three Ds.

The

first D is de-risk,

meaning

reduce our dependencies with respect to China. Rare Earth is one of them.

There

are other dependencies that require from ourselves to either be able to produce on European soil or diversify our partnerships. Otherwise, the relationship is unbalanced when you're too dependent on your partner. Second, dialogue.

And

tell China that

one

way or another,

if

the tsunami of Chinese industrial products

keeps

destroying European industry, someone will stand up

and

apply Trump-like tariffs on China.

So

unless we are able

to

restore some kind of balance, and this you do through dialogue,

then

at some point

the

confrontation, the trade war, whatever you want to call it, is inevitable.

If

it's not the pro-European forces that apply this kind of remedies, it will be populist or nationalist powers that will do it. They will just close the borders,

because

it will not be sustainable.

That's

the second D, dialogue.

And

the third D is deter.

Both

China and the US,

and

this is also one thing I keep mentioning to my European friends and colleagues, have a vital need

to

access the European market. European market is the largest, especially if you think about the great Europe, beyond the European Union, it is the largest of the world.

It

is very difficult for China to sustain its model

without being

able to address the European market.

And

on the other side,

bear

in mind that

a

quarter of the revenues

of

American big tech,

and

probably half of their profits are done in Europe.

If

you cut off Europe

from

the profit and loss account

of

American big tech, it's a big, big cut.

And

same with spending. Europeans invest three trillion more in the US than Americans invest in Europe. So America has a vital need of European savings.

And

we have now very powerful instruments

that

have never been really used so far for fear of

confrontation

with China or with the US.

But

we have a very attractive market, a vital market for both superpowers. And we have instruments that allow us to cut them off, this market, should they affect, of course, vital interest for Europe.

And

I would sort of, I would not use the bazooka at the first occasion. But I'm saying, if it's about the survival of the European economy, if it's about the protection of electoral processes and democracy, if it's about protecting European borders or the integrity of European territory, then European has very powerful levers to overturn the decision that can be made by one of the

two. Well,

thank you very much. I see in the audience, I'm sure there are going to be many questions. So I will give priority to the students. I'll take two or three questions at a time. Please identify yourself so I see the gentleman on the left.

There's

a microphone coming.

Bonjour, Monsieur le Ministre. Je m'appelle Alexandre Serrat. My question has to do with European defense and its leadership.

So

if France always doubted the reliability of the United States and provided extended deterrence or leading Europe's defense,

on

what basis should all the European countries place greater trust in France to fulfill that role?

In

other words, if the United States is today deemed unreliable, what actually makes France any more trustworthy as Europe's main security guarantor?

OK,

maybe a couple more questions. Yes?

Microphone.

Can I ask in French?

OK.

Bonjour, Monsieur le Ministre. Vous parlez beaucoup de l'Europe comme variable à haut potentiel dans l'équation géopolitique et le jeu des puissances

et

de

l'importance de... Oh, in English? The Minister

will understand French, but maybe not

the whole audience. Oh, sorry, because

I prefer it in French, so I was more prepared to say it in French. But let me know if I need to say it in English. You speak a lot about how Europe is to be a superpower tomorrow and that it's important to face the threats that the United States or China or Russia can represent. France, I was wondering if this idea of a Europe that is able to weigh and may be capable of resolving the crisis of multilateralism is somehow based on the idea of, like, an equilibrium piece, , like, hérité du congrès de Vienne, and that if it's possible to sustain that idea despite the failures of the Security Council during the 21st century. Thank you.

OK. And

the third question, and then we...

Hi.

Bonjour, Monsieur le Ministre. Thank you for joining us today. I was wondering, so regarding the tech policy, most of the developers you talk to are, in fact, themselves overwhelmed by the pace of AI. And so they make a strong argument that they think that the policy will not be able to catch up to the pace of AI development. So I was wondering what you would answer to them.

In

Europe, you mean?

Yeah.

From the European policy

standpoint. OK.

So first on nuclear deterrence, in Norway is the recent announcement by President Macron to strengthen our deterrence posture and to materialize the European dimension of our vital interest, which is called forward deterrence. In Norway is all of this meant to substitute to the American nuclear deterrence in Europe.

But

that being said,

your

question was broader than that,

and

I think,

you

know, is an important one.

What's

the right response to the sort of impredictability of, well, impredictability of

US

strategy and also US

willingness

expressed,

that

has been expressed for a long time now, to review

the

level of their commitment within NATO? What's the right response?

Well, you

have two schools. One is to cry

and

to let yourself be seized by despair.

And

the other one is enthusiasm and saying that the time has come for Europeans to develop their own vision and capacity within NATO.

And

I think this is what we should do

and

take seriously what the US have told us for a long time now. Please pick up

a

bigger share of the so-called burden. And this is what we have decided to do, which I think is a good thing, including because it makes us

gradually

less dependent, so we can speak freely,

so

we can have more balanced relationships with the other powers of this world. So I think it's great. The only thing is, of course, that it means big money.

And

so it requires choices, decisions, breaking habits, breaking inertia, etc., etc.

You

spoke about the Congrès de Vienne, Vienna Congress, and yes, it's more or less the idea. Open up a third path,

and

you will see that many countries in the world will join your coalition.

In

other terms, virtually all countries in the world are hoping for something else than a

sort

of global scale

rivalry

with the obligation to pick sides.

And they

are right to fear this from happening, because

the

race to the domination will take technological, military, commercial forms,

but

it will also take the form of a race to the alliance.

Who's

my friend? Who can I rely on? The more friends and allies I have, the fewer he has, or the fewer the rival will have.

And

when you capture Maduro, and then when you kill Khamenei after Bashar al-Assad has fallen, you're also, in some sense, trying to weaken your

rival by

removing some of its own allies and so on and so

forth. And

so virtually all countries of the world would like to have a safe place, a safe path, where they don't have to pick sides. But no one can, no other, I think, no other block than Europe can actually open such a path.

Not

that we are brighter. We're not. But we're just a more advanced coalition of countries where, because of history, we're wealthier than the other blocks. And we have this long history of war and suffering, and so on and so forth, that led us to be first contributors to the foundation of the UN and international law. And so we have a lot to offer in terms of international architecture.

Right

now,

speak

to leading nations in Asia or Africa or Latin America. They want us to stand up, but they don't see us

right

now as an alternative. Because they also have doubts as to whether we're going to be able to break inertia, to chain our habits, and to turn ourselves into a democratic superpower that is predictable and respectful of international law, sovereignty, and so on and so forth.

And

that's why I'm here, road showing that, yes, Europe is on the verge of becoming this democratic superpower. And this is what President Macron has been doing also in his various travels, including recently in Japan and South Korea. There is an interest for something else than having to pick sides

or

try to survive in between the two superpowers.

And

the last question was about digital. Yeah.

Clearly,

our dependencies

are

very alarming in terms of security,

even

though France is a bit of an exception, in terms of space and in terms of digital, in my view.

This

is why,

to

be really honest, because I was in charge of digital a few years ago, this is why we've been, and people have had a hard time reading us, but we've been super hard

on

the regulation of incumbent waves of digital technology, such as social networks, marketplaces,

the

revolution of 10 years ago that we just did not see coming. So now we've taken one of the most ambitious set of regulations to impose certain rules to the providers of these platforms. And we're hoping that

the

Commission can enforce these rules, because otherwise, what's the point of having a Commission, you know?

And

then, when came generative AI,

we

took the exact opposite stance. Why?

We

said

to

our European colleagues, do not regulate generative AI. And they were like, but I don't understand. You know, you exhausted us with regulations on social network, and now you don't want to regulate generative AI. What happened?

We

said, as long as we have a chance to forge our own generative AI, then we had better

give

as much possible space to innovation

than

regulating it upfront. Because the one that forges the technology always has more power on the technology the way it is used than the one that regulates

it. And

I think

we

perhaps saved

the

ability of Europe to have not

the

leading, you know, not the top one or two

players

in generative AI. But I think we do have

now, with

Mistral AI and its ecosystem,

we

have a generative AI technology

that

would

be

sufficient should we face massive restrictions from access to AI technologies coming from abroad. I'm not saying we would have the top of the pop technology, but we would have enough. And so we've been able, by perhaps for the first time regulating a little bit more smartly than before, or an emerging technology to give enough space and room for our own players to reach a stage where they are not completely outplaced.

Of

course, we need to go further. And this is something that I hope to see emerge in the French-German framework, because I think these are two

very

significant driving forces when they get together and they agree on principles. So we're in the process of working together to

make

sure we have the right European champions in AI and quantum,

but

that we also have an environment where we see more and more innovation in this field.

Yes,

another round of questions. So the lady in the back.

Thank you so much, Minister, for your question. So my question is like in your talk, you mentioned a lot of things about savings and the foreign aid. So my question is like you mentioned a lot of savings are going abroad and overseas, and it's not sustainable, and it's beginning to change. But how does that change translate into your FDI, the foreign development assistance? And also how do you strike the balance between international development, the expectations, and the less outgoing savings and aid? Thank you so much.

Okay.

Yes.

Thank

you so much. My question is about the far right in France. You mentioned that we are in danger if the tsunami of goods from China come over that we could have our own Trump in Europe. And now in France, the polls are pointing towards a very bad direction. What do you see is the main reason for this? What are you planning to do about this so that next year we can still welcome you here?

Okay. And the lady in the back there.

Thank

you so much. Bonjour, Monsieur le Ministre. My question is actually pretty related to the one I was just asked. You mentioned earlier stability, algorithms, spread of information. So how do you see the evolution of terrorist threats in Europe over the next decade, particularly with increasing food of population and digital radicalization, sorry? And to what extent do you think that this might undermine Europe at the international stage?

Good

point.

So

on the first one, the only thing I was saying is that