39. Strategic Autonomy, Revisited, with Sophie Pedder & Benjamin Haddad

The EU was founded in a way in the negation of power, in transcending power and replacing it with economics and law. I think now there's a growing realization, not only in Paris, but elsewhere in Europe, that the EU needs to reconcile itself with power.

France does not know it,

but

we are at war with America.

It's

a permanent war, an economic war, one seemingly without deaths, and yet a war to the death.

This

quote from former French President François Mitterrand

illustrates

the ancestral Gaelic defiance towards the US hyperpower, one that continues to haunt French strategic thinking.

So

when the US entered secret negotiations with Australia and the United Kingdom to launch the AUKUS Defence Partnership,

and

thus scuttling France's $90 billion submarine contract with Australia, Mitterrand's warnings turned pathetic.

Even

the usually diplomatic Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, spoke of a stab in the back.

This

extraordinary diplomatic development happened amidst an ongoing conversation on the concept of European strategic autonomy, a topic we at Uncommon Decency have covered in depth last year.

Can

the EU

become

a geopolitical actor in its own right,

and

not just a geopolitical playing field for the great powers of the 21st century?

Following

the events in Afghanistan and Australia, we wanted to take stock of where this conversation is headed,

and

whether the transatlantic relationship has suffered as a result.

Thanks

to all of you for coming back on the show. Jorge and I missed you doing our extended summer break, but we are back with a vengeance with a great series of episodes for the weeks to come.

New

season, new Uncommon Decency.

While

you can still continue to help us with the basics, such as rating the show, reviewing, subscribing, and of course sharing the pod with friends and family,

we

have also created a Patreon account to help us pay for our physical and digital equipment.

The

link to the account should be below in the description right here,

and

we would greatly appreciate your support.

And

if enough of you are interested in contributing, we will set up special events for our patrons, so stay tuned.

Good. Now,

Jorge, on to the show.

So

on the line, we are very glad to have two experts on this conversation around European strategic autonomy. Benjamin Haddad, you're currently the Senior Director of the Europe Centre at the Atlantic Council. Welcome back, I want to add, you're returning on the show.

As

you

were our

very first guest. I

was the first guest, yeah, it's great to be back. We

have discussed your book, Paradise Lost,

Europe

and the World of Trump, which was published in 2019,

in

which you wrestled with this notion of European strategic autonomy.

So

I really recommend our listeners go to listen to that episode, as well as buy the book.

Sophie

Péder,

you're

the Paris Bureau Chief for The Economist magazine, where you cover French politics and economics. You must be very busy these days. You published Emmanuel Macron and the Quest to Reinvent a Nation in 2018.

And

also for this conversation, you interviewed Emmanuel Macron

for

The Economist in 2019,

when

he famously stated that NATO was a brain dead organization.

So

both of these readings should be in our listeners' mandatory reading list,

as

I'm sure they will greatly inform our upcoming conversation.

Thank

you, Sophie. And thank you, Ben. Thank you. It's a pleasure to join you. Before we get started,

could

you give us a brief working definition

of

what strategic autonomy is, European strategic autonomy is? Or at

least

maybe how it is understood in both Paris

and

other European capitals,

with

its large implications for NATO and the transatlantic relationship? Benjamin, we'll go first to you and then we'll come back to Sophie.

Sure. Well, I would say working definition is just

the

European Union giving itself the ability

to

defend its interest and security on its own, if necessary.

This

is a theme that has really emerged in the last few years, especially as the United States under three administrations in a row now. Barack Obama, obviously, with the pivot to Asia, Donald Trump famously. And now I would argue the Biden administration as well. But we'll talk about this in more detail. have signaled shifting priorities away from Europe, away from regions in the Middle East or in Africa that have direct security impact on Europe. I think a good example of that was the Syrian crisis with its consequences in terms of migration and terror attacks

in

Europe.

And

so this is not something that is against

the

United States, that is not something that is against NATO or NATO as the cornerstone of transatlantic collective defense. But it is about stepping up

defense

capabilities at the European level, increasing cooperation on specific projects. And we've seen this in European defense last few years, PESCO, EDF, et cetera. But more importantly, even, it's about Europeans giving themselves the ability to think on their own, to defend their own interests on their own, if they need to, in a world that's become more dangerous to navigate, where Europe is surrounded by an arc of crisis, by aggressive powers at its borders. So it's just autonomy, it's not independence, but it is the ability to act as its own actor and reconcile the European Union with power. The EU was founded in a way in the negation of power, in transcending power and replacing it with

economics

and law. I think now there's a growing realization, not only in Paris, but elsewhere in Europe, that

the

EU needs to reconcile itself with power.

Sophie,

how is this conversation going on in Paris and across other European capitals?

Well,

it's fascinating to hear Ben's description because I agree with it, but I also think it's an extremely French version of what this means. I mean, what always strikes me is that

there

is a vision of what strategic autonomy means in France and in Paris, where I am, as Ben has laid out.

But

it's understood really quite differently in other parts of the continent. And I think this is part of the problem. If you're sitting in Berlin or Warsaw or anywhere closer to the Russian border, you don't really want anyone else to be responsible for your security than the United States or NATO, the NATO security umbrella. And

the

idea that Europe somehow is going to do this for themselves, which is the sort of purest, most, I guess, ambitious version of strategic autonomy, just seems far fetched and almost dangerous. So I think, you know, we have to recognise, even those of us who are very close to the conversation in France, that this is understood differently in other parts of the continent. And almost however many times President Macron explains that this is about increasing capacity, that this isn't about undermining NATO, that this is about complementing the transatlantic alliance. It is nonetheless understood in other parts of Europe as being exactly those, that sort of a project.

So I think, you know, that's, I would just add that as a sort of word of caution in a way to Ben's excellent definition of what strategic autonomy in Europe means.

Yeah, I,

you know, I think Sophie is exactly right. I think the definition I gave in a way is the definition of the supporters of strategic autonomy, who also have

the

humility to recognise that, you know, in no way means driving Americans away from the continent or replacing NATO, which first is not something we should wish for, but also something that's definitely not realistic in any short or medium term horizon. And when you look at the asymmetry and capabilities between

the

United States and Europe, especially when it comes to major threats on our border like Russia, and this is why countries like Poland or the Baltic states rightly argue that NATO should be the cornerstone of collective defence on the continent on issues like this. But I think where we see a debate that sometimes a little surprising from some corners of Europe is that there is a sense,

and

sometimes I wonder if it's not a straw man, that any European effort towards strategic autonomy, which means increasing capabilities and the ability to act on our own as Europeans,

would

alienate the United States, would drive America away from protecting Europe. And here, you know, we're really going to the core of the core of

the topic

here,

I

think there are two issues, you know, the first one is, in a way, America is already shifting its priorities and interests. And if you listen to President Biden's speech during the Afghanistan withdrawal, where he says, well, you know, now our military intervention will focus on our vital national interests,

I

do think that, for example, an Article 5 aggression would count as a vital national interest for Joe Biden and most American presidents. And he's called Article 5 a holy obligations, I think that's pretty clear,

but

when it comes to other regional crisis around Europe, Libya or the Western Balkans, like we had in the 90s, or

the

Eastern Mediterranean, I'm not so sure. And I think these sorts of crises could really stress European institutions, and this is where Europeans need to have the abilities to act. And the second point that's a little surprising when you hear

the

criticism from the opponents of strategic autonomy

is

that

America

has been asking Europeans to step up defense spending, to increase their capabilities, to take responsibility. We've heard President Obama and President Trump in different styles, but both talk about free riding coming from Europe.

And

it's weird because sometimes there's maybe

a

sense that some Europeans

want

to stay weak because they think it's going to force America to stay committed to the continent.

And

I say this as someone who

is

in Washington, a Frenchman, but in Washington, I'm afraid this is going to have the exact opposite. And it's creating a form of resentment among the American public opinion, but also American politics, and will drive a wedge between the ISIS and Europe. So if you want to be good allies, you need to bring value-added and capabilities. And this is where also strategic autonomy, I think, would actually be an asset for the transatlantic relationship.

Just

to add to that point, Ben, I would say that, you know, your point about what strategic autonomy means is really crucial. And I think this is one of the difficulties with this debate is that, you know, nobody really does define what it means. And therefore, there are people who are hostile to it without really ever defining what they're hostile to. It's the most ambitious version, as you said, is collective defense of the European territory. I mean, very few people really think that that's a realistic short-term prospect of any sort.

But I think, you know, the near-neighborhood issues where Europe can or could do more together with or without America's support, that's exactly what the sort of more realistic version of strategic autonomy, to my mind, means. And one example of that would be in the Sahel, where you have a project there

by

the French to wind down and reshape their Operation Barkhane, which has been

a

French-led operation, and transform it into something that is going to involve a lot more European special forces around a special forces task force called Tacuba, which is backed by the Americans, and this is a crucial point.

You

know, America provides intelligence, it provides logistical support to the operation, but it's, you

know,

the Europeans,

most

of them French, but the increasing numbers of Europeans on the ground, boots on the ground, doing the tough fighting. And I think that's the sort of example of a neighborhood conflict, really tough,

but

one that Europeans could and can and are, in fact, doing more, but with American support.

Yeah, I think that's a great example to emulate. And you're right, Sophie. I

mean,

I think

the

problem with the French is that they love philosophical conversations and debates, for which Americans, but also a lot of our European friends, don't have a lot of patience, understandably. And so, you know, it is important.

I

think now

it's

clear that this concept, this idea or slogan, whatever you want to call it, of strategic autonomy has imposed itself in the debate with people who are pro and against. And now the challenge for France and for the supporters of this is to really turn this into very concrete operational proposals and initiatives. Otherwise, we'll stay at a conceptual level. My friend Gerard, the former French ambassador to the U.S. that I think you had in the podcast, too, you know, often says that the French like to say,

you

know, it works in practice, but does it work in theory? And

I

think that's something that we maybe need to rid ourselves of.

Right.

And this is precisely trying to bring the theory down to

to

the practical arena. One question, you know, it seems from from the outline that you've both given, it seems like one of the possible interpretations of this notion of strategic autonomy is quite simply that Europe is it should be able to define its interests independently of how how those interests, how those interests have been defined as part of the transatlantic relationship. And I wonder what what what the effect is going to be of the recent conflict over the defense contract with Australia, with the Australians walking out of their defense contract for procuring submarines, walking out of a deal they had with France and whether an event like that is going to drive a wedge between

France

and America, starting with Ben and then turning to Sophie.

Sure.

Well, maybe if I can backtrack for 30 seconds on AUKUS to really stress why it creates such a steer in Paris. It's really important to understand that I think this was not mostly about the commercial aspect of this. Yes, it was a lot of money, although it was less than reported. And a lot of media were only because half of the contract was actually owned by an American company, Lockheed Martin. So, you know, these are huge contract and there's industrial interest for sure. But it's really the breach of trust among allies. It's really the fact that the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom negotiate this new alliance and this contract in complete secrecy.

And sometimes it seems they may have lied to the French when this issue was raised in bilateral consultations. And it really undercuts France's strategy in the Indo-Pacific. And it's particularly stunning for French policymakers as they saw this Indo-Pacific strategy as contributing to an allied strategy in the region.

You

know, France has close to 2 million citizens in the region. It has strategic partnerships with countries that are the same allies as the United States, Australia, Japan, India. It participates to freedom of navigation operations inside of China Sea. It even patrolled the Strait of Taiwan a few months ago, which led to tensions with China. So here you have France maybe acting as an autonomous ally, although it is participating also to maritime exercises with the U.S. and the U.K. in the region. But that was really contributing to, I think, a transatlantic strategy in the region. So it's really unfortunate the way

it

was done. It's unfortunate that the Biden administration didn't find a way to maybe bring in France in this new alliance, in this new contract as well. I think some creative thinking could have been done here to avoid this bilateral crisis. I insist on the breach of trust because this is why,

yes,

I do think it will have a long-term impact. You know, anecdotally, I just came back from France. I spoke at events in Caen. I spoke at events in Ocea outside of Paris. And I was asked about the submarines. This is something that really sent tremors not only

in

the French defense elite, but even in the French public opinion.

And

we've seen a lot of the opposition agitate, calling for France to withdraw from the integrated military command of NATO, which it famously reintegrated in 2008 under President Sarkozy after close to four decades of absence. So, you know, this will have an impact. This will also weaken, I think, some of the most transatlanticist voices in the French defense establishment, who were generally the ones who were also pushing for the Indo-Pacific strategy. But I think the phone call between President Biden and President Macron, which started a little bit to heal the wounds and led to Philippe Petain, the French ambassador to the U.S.

to be called back to travel back to the U.S., I think it hit all the right notes. And I think it laid out an agenda to work now in the next few months on the Sahel that Sophie mentioned, on a more capable European defense alongside NATO, on the Indo-Pacific. And now the real question, especially with the French presidency of the European Union coming in the first semester of 2022, will be, how do we deliver? How do we turn

the opportunities,

maybe the doors open from this conversation into concrete action?

And

Sophie, what do you make of this breach of trust between France and America?

I know Ben's described this very well. And I think, you know, having been in Paris, that the depths of anger, it's hard to exaggerate it. You know, Jean-Yves Le Drian, the foreign minister, was fuming on the radio and then subsequent events. He, you know, calling it a stab in the back. This was not, as some in Washington, I think, have sought to portray a kind of staged or choreographed

fit

by France. This was really deeply felt hurt, humiliation even, and, as Ben said, a breach of trust. Now, I think, you know, where this all goes from here, there is a somewhat positive scenario that one could try to construct now, I think. It starts with that Biden-Macron phone call, which took days, you know, it took a week to set place. Macron was not taking that phone call.

But

after it, the declaration, the joint declaration by both presidents was very interesting to my mind, in particular on a couple of points. One of them

was

the fact that the U.S.

explicitly

backed and said it would continue to back the operation in the Sahel and was grateful to the French for running it.

But

the other was really interesting. And that was a line saying that the U.S. recognises the importance of stronger and more capable European defence and

that

it contributes positively to and is complementary to NATO. Now, that's quite a concession from America to something that has often been caricatured as being exactly the opposite. Support for European defence, you could say it's just words. Macron has been insisting that he now wants some actions. But the optimistic scenario, I think, would be that there is now an opportunity, possibly, to clear the air, to try and rebuild some sort of confidence, and for that to involve the Americans supporting European efforts, and particularly the French-led version of European efforts, to strengthen European defence capacity and along the lines that Macron has wanted to.

So, I'm not suggesting for a moment that it's easy, or it will be easy, or that there hasn't been trust lost, but I do think that there is at least an effort now by the French not to sort of sulk in the corner and nurse their wounds, but to see

or

look at ways in which this could be an opportunity to build something in the direction that they have long sought to do.

Ben,

I want to go on the other side of the Atlantic.

What

role does America expect Europeans to play? Because Biden's America is back slogan seemingly wanted to make a contrast with Donald Trump on insisting that America will treat its democratic allies with respect.

And

it saw it as well as a strategic move in order to confront China with a more united Western front.

And

yet it seems in the past nine months

that

the US has needlessly antagonised its allies, first of all in AUKUS, we've covered that, also in Afghanistan, there's a new Buy American Act on US Public Procurement, which is creating tensions.

The

travel ban to the US is going to be lifted in a month after months of recrimination by European allies.

Is

there a US strategy for Europe

or

are these unforced tactical errors by the Biden administration?

That's

a great question.

Let

me first pick up just on what Sophie just said on the Biden-Macron call and the concession, rhetorical concession, at least from the United States on European defence, because I do think that's really important. And, you know, I've spoken to a lot of friends here in D.C. who say, and it's a legitimate point, you say, well, of course, we want Europeans to spend more and unite more. And what does it have to do with us? After all, it's up to Europeans to do it. That's only partly true. And I think American policymakers tend to underestimate the agency they have on what Europeans do on defence, because what America thinks of all this does matter a lot in certain capitals of Europe.

And some Europeans have been extremely reluctant to embrace European defence initiatives because they think this is what America wants to hear.

And

so then they'll go to Washington and say, well, we are

not

enthusiastic about the European defence efforts and the French are forcing us to do it.

And

the Americans are saying, well, you know, these Europeans are coming to us saying they don't want to do it. You have this vicious circle that someone needs to break.

And

I think if you had

clear

messaging coming from Washington

saying

we need you to do this, this is positive for you and for the alliance, it could start to break that vicious circle. In the 90s,

you

know, Manning Albright famously talked about the risk of duplication of redundancies between European defence and NATO. And interestingly, you know, in the 90s, it might have been true, actually. And I think now it's much less true. Now you have constant dialogue and coordination on the different strategic concepts between NATO and the European Union. The EU invests in areas that are seen as complementary to what NATO does. And so I think it's really time to, for good, lift these taboos and overcome them. And this is where the Biden administration has a great opportunity. And this links me directly to your question, Francois. You know,

the

Biden administration came in basically putting

Europe

and allies and American leadership supporting liberal democracy at the centre of its international vision. And clearly, this was a way to not only turn the page on the Trump administration and tensions and recriminations we had seen, but also as the priority is clearly now the systemic rivalry with China. I think the Biden administration sees the network of allies that the United States has as its best asset and not only just on military issues. You know, we've launched last week the Transatlantic Tech and Trade Council between the European Union and the U.S., which will allow to forge common norms and standards on AI, a strategy on microchips.

How do we think about intellectual property, about data privacy, all these issues on which the EU has actually risen as a key actor and that are going to be so critical also in the rivalry with China and how we think about the future of the international system and globalization. But I think sometimes,

you

know, there's I think now it's time to go

beyond

the sort of America's back rhetoric, which was destined to reassure Europeans and have a more frank conversation as allies and friends, not as foes like we had under the Trump administration, but a conversation as allies and friends about

what

America does not want to do anymore. Where it expects Europeans to step up and take responsibility.

What

kind of alliance do we want? Do we want Europeans with us in the Indo-Pacific or do we want Europeans to actually increase capabilities in their own neighborhood to ensure a stable and secure Europe, which is key for America to then project its power in the Pacific? We need to have this conversation, be a little creative and realize that the transatlantic relationship is is changing and that's OK. We have shifting priorities and we need to address that. And I think there's been maybe a little bit of a sentimentalism and a little bit of nostalgia on both sides of the Atlantic for the 90s or even the relationship of the Cold War. And that's behind us. And so to your point, Francois,

I

don't think what we've seen in the last few months has been accidental. I don't think it's linked to,

you

know, people making mistakes. Yes, there's a problem of staffing. You know, the State Department, we just confirmed Karen Donford as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe. We still don't have a U.S. ambassador to NATO, to Paris, to Brussels, to Berlin. And a lot of really talented individuals have been nominated, but not yet confirmed by the Senate. So, you know, all this does play a role.

But

I think we're we're facing something much more structural than this that started before Biden and that we need to address to be able to to rethink the transatlantic relationship.

Sophie, what do

you

make of Ben's comments? And also,

have

you observed the past few weeks

moving

the needle a bit on this conversation across not just in Paris, but across Europe? Has there been some support towards the French? Has there been, on the contrary, some skepticism, some muted responses? How has the rest of Europe reacted to the past few weeks?

Well,

I think I would bring in another country we haven't mentioned yet into this conversation, and that's actually the UK.

OK.

You know, I think that viewed from France, part of what has happened with AUKUS, and this is very different to the conclusion that London drew after the whole shambolic fiasco of American withdrawal from Afghanistan, when Britain was very much on the same end

as

France, Germany and others, that is to say, you know,

scrambling

to get its people out, you know, and a feeling of having been sort of left high and dry.

That

was one issue. But then when it came to AUKUS,

the

UK was firmly and squarely back where it feels more comfortable. And that is to say, allied to Anglophone countries. I was going to say the US, but I think it really is this sort of Anglophone alliance where the UK feels comfortable. Certainly the UK under Boris Johnson feels comfortable. It's part, you know, there's the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement. It's a common language. And that is where

the

UK is sort of feels as its natural, natural home in a way, in terms of security relationships. Which which is part of an answer to your question, you know, how have how has Europe responded? Well,

I

mean, Britain is still part of geographically part of Europe. It's still the only other significant, really

serious

military power in Europe. The only other holder.

Of

the United States and United Nations Security Council seat.

And

therefore,

it

does matter in this sort of conversation what the UK thinks. And to my mind, I was really struck by actually a very muted response to AUKUS on the part of other continental Europeans or other members of the European Union. It took a few days before you began to hear here and there a few comments of response of solidarity with France on this. But it wasn't there was there were in some in some quarters there was actually criticism of the idea that this was anything to do with the rest of Europe, that this was a bilateral French problem. So I think, you know,

this

AUKUS has clarified a lot of things about the UK and where the UK thinks it sits in the world and where it thinks it sits relative to the to the European Union. But also,

I

think it's it's

the

time it took for other Europeans to make sympathetic or even constructive noises towards France was also fairly telling.

Sure.

And shifting away from from AUKUS and into again, back into strategic autonomy, one of the areas that has been kind of a testing ground for the notion of strategic autonomy, which you've been following very closely, Ben, is is the eastern Mediterranean. And on September 27th, France inked a defense deal with Greece,

it

committed which committed to purchase three billion euros worth of French warships. You know, the deal also includes mutual defense assistance. There's obviously the ongoing span of tensions between Greece and Turkey and France has been playing a role there. And what is this new partnership lie? And how does it relate to the conversation on on strategic autonomy, starting with Ben and then turning to Sophie?

Well,

first, I think something that Sophie knows better than than I do, because she's the one who conducted this historic interview, is that it's important to remember that the brain dead comment that Macron famously made at the time

was

mostly about Turkey was, you know, that was just after the US withdrawal from North East Syria and the Turkish incursion, which has created a crisis between France and Turkey in the in the region. And Turkey is obviously a NATO member. The relationship with Turkey with the NATO now is awkward. And it's, I think, a question mark for both Europeans and Americans. And so this is why I think this this agreement between France and Greece

is

really interesting. It's a really interesting and I would say potentially historic agreement where you see two EU members to NATO members deciding to

move

even forward in their bilateral defense relationship.

And

France committing to defend Greece and defend Greece's territorial integrity. I think we remember that Greece is threatened by Turkey and its maritime sovereignty. And we had some tensions last summer in the eastern Mediterranean where France actually sent a ship

to

support Greece, but also Cyprus in in their sovereignty.

And

I would say just in defense of international law, which is unfortunately, I think, an issue on which we've seen other European actors be a little muted. And so this is why, you

know,

I think it's it's a it's a creative way to go forward. One thing that strikes me with AUKUS,

I

think, as Sophie said, the Brits really do see this as rekindling with the Anglo speaking world and with five eyes. I'm not sure that's a perspective in the United States. I don't think they really

think

that much about the Anglo-Saxon world or the English speaking world and in five eyes.

I

think what AUKUS reveals is

I

think a more flexible way of conducting foreign policy. You know, Moses Naim had called this mini lateralism ten years ago in a really interesting book called The End of Power. And I think this is what it is. It's to say, you know, OK, we have NATO, we have the European Union, we have multilateral organizations, but also we're going to shape a la cat coalitions and alliances according to the challenge that we're facing. And this is a trend we've seen in recent years. I mean, from the creation of the G20 to TTIP and the TPP because the WTO doesn't work anymore. This sort of creative multilateralism in new forms of alliances. And so

I

think,

you know,

when you think about strategic autonomy, you might say, well, we need

to

move forward at 27 with decision making process initiatives are at the 27 level. And that's burdensome and slow. Or you can say, let's be flexible and creative, agile about how we think about this. And so you'll have a Franco-Greek alliance in the East Med here. And then you have other sorts of partnerships there.

It's

unfortunate to see the tension between France and the Yang Kingdom right now, because I actually think in August during the Afghanistan withdrawal, you saw, I think, a resumption of communication initiatives between Paris and London that was quite interesting and could have led to interesting initiatives. So I think the key word here is really to be to be agile and create these correlations according to challenges.

Yes,

I think that's right, Ben. I mean, your analysis of the Eastern Med situation and the Franco-Greek deal is exactly right. And it does go back to that conversation that I had with Emmanuel Macron. It was in October 2019.

And

he was concerned not just about Turkish behavior, unilateral Turkish behavior as a fellow member of NATO, but also about the United States, which had also withdrawn at very short notice from northeastern Syria. So there was a sense in which there were two NATO allies that were acting without any sort of coordination or even communication with each other, let alone with other NATO members.

So

I think that that is absolutely the sort of backdrop to understanding the importance of the Franco-Greek deal. It's not the first time, of course, that two European Union members have promised or enshrined a mutual defense clause because the French and the Germans did that, of course, at the Arcan Treaty. But it's the significance of it, I think, is exactly as Ben laid out. Now, on the UK, you know, ideally,

of

course, there would be some kind of strategic dialogue between the UK and France. And operationally, the two armies work incredibly well together. I saw that in Mali last year. You know, the British are out there. You can see it. And if you talk to the armed forces on each side, they want to, they do, they work well together. But politically, there is just such a level of distrust at the moment between London and Paris

that

I see it. It seems very difficult to me to see how

you

can have any sort of meaningful

strategic

conversation about how to work together at a political level with France and the UK. And that's that's a real, real loss, because, you know, if you do pursue this idea of something more flexible,

the

UK ought to and should be involved. And so it's a real problem, I think.

Yeah.

To see where this conversation is going, I want to focus on one of France's main neighbours, of course, Germany,

which,

as on all European matters, is a key player.

The

country is currently and will be paralysed for the next few weeks, probably months in protracted coalition negotiations,

which

is coincidentally when France will be having the presidency of the Council of the EU.

But what

do the candidates of the main German parties say about this question of strategic autonomy?

And has

the election moved the needle on this conversation at all? Ben and then Sophie?

Yeah,

I

think

that this election will move the needle

in

the right direction, but it will be still very slow. Olaf Scholz, who's the likely new chancellor, is a committed European. We've seen the Green Party increase its score, maybe below what it was polling a few months ago. But still, it is actually still a historic showing for the Green Party, which has had, I think, a pretty strong foreign policy message on Russia, on China, on bolstering European initiatives. But there are two issues, I think, here. The first one is that if you do want to increase capabilities, that doesn't mean making budgetary

choices

at a time where we've already spent a lot on COVID recovery, of course. And it's likely that the FTP, the liberals who are fiscal hawks, will play an important role in the new coalition, maybe even hold the finance ministry. So that's something to keep in mind. And the second aspect is more structural. I would say beyond just the coalition making is that

I

think Germany does not

feel

a direct sense of threat

to

the in today's world. I think the status quo actually there's a sense, at least among the German political establishment, that the status quo is playing in Germany's favor. And so there's not really a sense of urgency to invest in these capabilities. I think you've had some strong voices.

You

know, AKK, the defense minister, has been an interesting voice. She's a critic of strategic autonomy, but she's more broadly been really in favor of European stepping up capabilities. But there's not the urgency coming from Berlin. And that's something I think that's troubling for other Europeans.

I

would say one last thing, though, that's interesting is that one thing that's been a little specific to Angela Merkel has been the strong relationship with China. Of course, Germany has a very deep trade relationship with China. But I think that the tone from all the political parties, but also actually from the business world in Germany, is starting to shift on China with a more lucid approach to this. So you might see a more critical take coming out of Berlin in the next few years.

Sophie, we are going to interview actually your colleague in Berlin, Tom, on the German coalition negotiations.

But you

can respond to that question, but also I think it would be interesting to see how does Macron approach these negotiations?

How

does he think he can put this topic on the forefront,

maybe

influence where he can influence these conversations? Sophie?

Well,

I mean, just to follow up on what Ben said, I think that this is absolutely right. There's, you know, some potential for movement, but it's going to be very slow. Germany still doesn't spend 2% of its GDP on defense as NATO members are supposed to. And, you know, Germany just has a very, very different defense culture. You know, when you're in Paris, it's just quite striking how much consensus there is about French military operations overseas. France loses men and sometimes women in the Sahel. And this is accepted because France has a culture which believes that

overseas

operations like that are in France's interests. Now, you know, expeditionary military culture doesn't belong in Germany. And for obvious reasons, it's it's it's therefore a very different sort of partner for the French. That's not to say that Germany hasn't

moved

outside that comfort zone in some ways, including in the Sahel. But, you know, putting boots in the ground in harm's way, putting boots on the ground in harm's way is something that

the

country will do with great difficulty, I think.

How

does Macron then push his ideas forward, particularly under the French presidency of the European Council, which starts in January? I mean, you know, Macron is great at sort of pushing out the big idea, provoking a response, grabbing attention. He's not quite so good at building the sort of alliances you need in order to make those proposals a reality. And it does involve not just working with Germany, it involves working with all sorts of other European partners. I mean, Italy is a very good example.

You

know, Italy under Draghi, exactly the sort of partner France should be working very well with. There are there are, you know, numerous other examples that the Estonians, for example, are working, have provided special forces to the Tacuba in the Sahel for the for the to the French work very well with them there. Those are the sorts of partners of all the different sorts, small, big, medium that Macron needs to work with. And that's, you know, perhaps the sort of weaker side of the way he approaches the strategic autonomy debate.

Ben,

do you want to bounce back and

wrap?

No,

I know. Look, I agree with this. I think, you

know,

it's interesting because if I remember correctly, I think the I may be wrong on this, but I think the Sorbonne speech was actually pronounced during the last negotiation in German coalition building and,

you

know, may have been also intended to sort of influence German politics toward a more ambitious and pro European approach at the time. And there's been famously a lot of frustration in Paris that

Merkel

was never seen as really responding to the Sorbonne vision and proposing her own vision or her own alternative. And clearly, we've seen very different styles between Merkel and Macron. They've worked well together, especially in the last year with the historic EU recovery fund that sets to be noted. But clearly, you know, Macron brings sort of the long term vision and has not always been very good at building coalitions within Europe to defend this agenda, where Merkel has been a more short term tactical politician that's pretty good at building coalitions. But sometimes coalitions,

but sometimes coalitions

is status quo rather than reform, a very slow and cautious incremental reform. And that also says something not only about the two personalities, but I think they're two products of very different political systems. The very centralized Gaulist system of the fifth republic where there's one boss, it's the president and the coalition building of the German system where, you know, first you have a coalition government, then you have a stronger Bundestag, then you have a more decentralized system with landers. And so you have to be attuned to

building

these coalitions all the time, which I think prepares you well for the way the European Union functions. I think now, you know, what's going to be really interesting in the next few months is we're talking about the German election. We have a French election coming next spring,

which

will happen during the French presidency of the European Union. And so it's a it's an opportunity, I think, for France to really try to make some some important gains, both on European defense. I think that will be one of the centerpieces of Macron's agenda, but also on other issues such as digital and how to deal with big tech companies. So that will be, I think, an interesting to to follow. And of course, then a really critical French presidential election where it does seem once again like the alternative to Macron will be a populist far right. But maybe not Marine Le Pen this time, but maybe Eric Zemmour, who

in

certain aspects is an even more radical, I think, candidate when it comes to a lot of the issues we've talked about today.

We

are fact checking team has checked your claim, Benjamin. And indeed, the last Sorbonne speech was during the coalition negotiations was actually a week after the last German election. So there is a probably some timing here that happened back then. Thanks a lot, Sophie. Thanks a lot, Ben, for this fascinating conversation where we took stock of this conversation on European strategic autonomy a year after our very first episode on this very topic. Thank you so much for both of you and see you all next week. So Sophie and Ben are out. But before we do this usual outro and bounce off ideas with just the both of us, I wanted to talk a little bit to you, our listeners.

We've

been away a lot for the past few months. We've been working on this new season. We've been taking a break. So we've come back with a few new ideas. First and foremost, if you want to show your support to the show, you can do the normals, you know, usual sharing, liking the reviewing. All these things are tremendously useful to us. But now if you want to show that extra bit of love, you can also support us on Patreon. And we are experimenting with it right now. But we are hoping that if enough of you around, we will be able to have some paid tears. We'll be able to have a kind of lot of creative interactions with you right now. It's just for you to show your support.

But if it takes on with you guys, maybe you can make something bigger out of it.

Absolutely. As you said, sharing is caring. And here's an easy way for all of our listeners to chip in and show their support of the show by contributing however much or little they wish. So our patient pages is linked on our Twitter profile page. So if you head over to Twitter, the pin tweet that will show up first is should

also be in our description down below. The description of the episode should be able to find the link and click below.

Yes. And shifting gears to to kind of digesting this whole conversation on strategic autonomy, I was particularly happy to do this as it to mark a year since we first launched the show. And the first episode that we went online with was an episode on strategic autonomy with Ben. It was a single guest episode. We kind of talked mostly about his book, but it was a really good grounding. I think it gave folks a really good grounding on what it is that Macron means when he talks about strategic autonomy.

And so I think it was a great opportunity for all of our listeners to revisit this concept a year on with Ben and another guest and to sort of, you know, test the waters and see where where this concept is headed as we reel from the AUKUS conflict. And the thing that I really take away from this episode is that

so

whenever whenever we discuss strategic autonomy, we ought to bear in mind that Europe is not the subject of people's loyalties in the same way that France is the subject of people's loyalties. Europe is not a state. Europe is a multilateral organization. So obviously, Ben was, you know, primarily dealing with the defense and security aspects and components of strategic autonomy. And when you talk about defense,

I

mean,

first

of all, there's no

there's

no question that that Europe will never be able to raise an army in the same way that France raises an army. But even the little things that states can do to reinforce European security, I think, are always going to be limited and hampered by the fact that Europe is people that people are not as excited about a common European defense as they will be about protecting the borders of their nation state. What did you think of this whole episode?

First of all, on this

AUKUS

ruckus,

I

think I think a few words thing Ben is right. Some Americans and some Brits are saying, you

know,

it's just a French milking in being angry because they lost a contract. The breach of trust is staggering.

I

don't think we've seen this kind of sabotage of French interests by an ally in a very long time.

So

the reaction might have seemed excessive, but I believe me in France, people were generally outraged that we could be backstabbed this way. And also, it kind of confirms this

latent

suspicion on the far right and on the far left, especially of the US. And we started this episode with a quotation from Mitterrand saying there is a permanent war, an economic war with the United States. And this thing is kind of haunting French strategic thinking.

So

in many ways, Macron might not be re-elected

in

six months time.

But

what this did is give a lot of fodder

to

a very anti-American, to very anti-American figures. And we were talking a little bit about Zemmour at the very end of the episode.

And

Zemmour is very anti-American in his politics. He's anti-NATO. He's very suspicious of America. And so this is kind of only giving fuel to those kind of candidates. I think it's I'm not sure whether it's a mistake from the Biden administration or whether it's a deliberate snub. But either way, it's going to have serious consequences.

Now,

on what this means kind of more generally, not just for the EU,

it

seems to me that we are seeing a kind of new world develop. I was reading a lot what Aris Racinos was writing in Unheard over the past few months, and he's been developing all this concept. But we could be living in an era in an era where the grand multilateral alliances that structured our world and we inherited those alliances from the Cold War are less relevant. And it's not only this orcus ruckus with with France and Australia, but the Franco-Greek defense pact is implicitly aimed or maybe explicitly aimed at Turkey, which is another NATO ally. And we are seeing all these kind of sub NATO agreements

that

are proving Macron's analysis about NATO being brain dead to be very true.

And maybe

we are seeing a new world in which the notion of alliances could be under threat with the emergence of seemingly more opportunistic diplomatic strategies. Look at Russia, for example. Russia is all over the place diplomatically.

With

Turkey, depending on the issue, it's quite close or quite or frontally opposed. China's also have this kind of very opportunistic diplomatic strategy. Maybe it's going to be much harder to think in terms of bloc in the future.

Yeah,

absolutely.

And

with that, we will wind up the episode. Thank you so much to all of our listeners for tuning in for another week. And stay tuned as we release the new season.

And

don't forget, like, review, subscribe, share the episode. And now you can even support us on Patreon. So thank you to all of you for staying until the end of the episode. And we are looking forward to seeing you next week. Thanks.